Remedial responsibility for severe poverty: justice or humanity? by Tomalty, Jesse
 1 
Remedial Responsibility for Severe Poverty: Justice or Humanity?1 
Jesse Tomalty 
 
Accepted for publication in the Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 October 2014 
 
Abstract 
Remedial responsibility is the prospective responsibility to assist those in great need. 
With tens of millions of people worldwide suffering from severe poverty, questions 
about the attribution of remedial responsibility and the nature of the relevant duties of 
assistance are among the most pressing of our time. This paper concerns the question of 
whether remedial responsibility for severe poverty is a matter of justice or of humanity. I 
discuss three kinds of situation in which an agent owes remedial responsibility to another 
suffering from severe poverty. In the first, the remedially responsible agent foreseeably 
and avoidably caused the poverty. In the second, the poverty was caused by forces 
outside the control of any agent, such as natural disaster. And in the third situation, the 
agent who was originally attributed remedial responsibility fails to fulfil it, and so 
remedial responsibility for the poverty in question is acquired by a secondary bearer. 
According to David Miller, remedial responsibility is a matter of justice in the first two 
situations, but not in the third. I argue that his grounds for thinking that remedial 
responsibility in the second situation are in tension with his view that remedial 
responsibility is not a matter of justice in the third situation. This has important 
implications in our world in which remedial responsibilities too often go unfulfilled.   
 
1.  
Some situations are so bad that it is morally intolerable that they persist, assuming the 
feasibility of remedying them. A paradigmatic example of this kind of situation is severe 
poverty. Where people are unable to meet their basic material needs, and where it is 
feasible to relieve the tremendous suffering they thereby endure, its persistence is morally 
intolerable: the situation ought morally to be remedied. This much is widely agreed, but it 
leaves open the crucial question of who bears the responsibility to remedy it. This kind 
of responsibility is what David Miller refers to as ‘remedial responsibility’: the 
prospective responsibility to assist those in great need.2 With tens of thousands of people 
dying each day of poverty-related causes and millions more chronically unable to meet 
their most basic material needs, the question of which agents are responsible for 
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remedying severe poverty is among the most pressing of our time. A related question, 
and one that will be the focus in what follows, concerns the nature of remedial 
responsibility for severe poverty, once it has been attributed. In particular, we are 
interested in whether the duties associated with remedying the plight of the very poor are 
a matter of justice or of humanity. 
According to Miller, remedial responsibility for severe poverty is in some cases a 
matter of justice and in other cases a matter of humanity. 3  On his view, remedial 
responsibility for severe poverty is owed as a matter of justice in two sorts of case: One 
is when the remedial responsibility in question tracks rectificatory responsibility - the 
responsibility to rectify past or ongoing injustices. The other is when the deprivation in 
question cannot reasonably be attributed to any agent or agents, for example where it is 
the result of a natural disaster. In the latter sort of case, Miller argues that it is the human 
right to subsistence that grounds remedial responsibility towards those left deprived. 
In either type of case just described, the agent attributed remedial responsibility 
can be said to be the primary bearer of that responsibility. In some cases, however, the 
primary bearer of remedial responsibility will fail to discharge this responsibility. In such 
cases, according to Miller, remedial responsibility is then acquired by a secondary bearer. 
This is because, as we have seen, the attribution of remedial responsibility is motivated 
by the moral intolerability of the situation remaining unremedied, and so where the 
primary bearer of remedial responsibility fails to act, another agent will be morally 
required to step in. In such cases, however, Miller argues that the remedial responsibility 
of the secondary bearer is a humanitarian duty rather than a duty of justice.4  
In what follows, I argue that we should resist Miller’s account of when remedial 
responsibility for severe poverty is a matter of justice and when it is a matter of humanity. 
I begin in the next section with a brief discussion of what is at stake in distinguishing 
between justice and humanity. In section 3, I outline Miller’s account of the grounds for 
remedial responsibility and discuss in more detail his case for thinking that remedial 
responsibility for severe poverty is never a matter of justice in cases where it has been 
acquired by a secondary bearer. In section 4, I advance an argument for why we should 
reject this view. Briefly stated, my argument is that, given how Miller understands the 
distinction between justice and humanity, his view about when remedial responsibility for 
severe poverty is a matter of humanity is in tension with his view that remedial 
responsibility grounded in the human right to subsistence is a matter of justice. I 






Why should we care whether remedial responsibility is characterized as a matter of justice 
or of humanity? What is at stake in drawing this distinction? The distinction between 
duties of justice and humanitarian duties has been drawn in a number of ways, and there 
is no apparent consensus in the literature on which one is correct. Although there are 
important conceptual distinctions to be drawn between different kinds of duties, there 
are scant grounds for claiming that any one of them constitutes the exclusively correct 
way of understanding the distinction between justice and humanity. As such, a 
deflationary view of the debate is most apposite: what matters is not which way of 
distinguishing duties of justice from humanitarian duties is terminologically accurate. 
Rather, what matters is that when drawing the distinction, we make clear what we take to 
be the conceptual distinction that it reflects.5 For our purposes, then, what is relevant is 
how Miller understands the distinction between duties of justice and humanitarian duties.  
On Miller’s view, duties of justice are distinguished from humanitarian duties in 
two ways. First he holds that humanitarian duties ‘are in general less weighty than duties 
of justice’ (p. 248). This implies that when two potential duties conflict, if one is a duty of 
justice and the other a humanitarian duty, the latter will, in general, give way to the 
former. The second difference between duties of justice and humanitarian duties 
according to Miller is that the former are ‘enforceable in principle by third parties’.6 This 
implies that, barring countervailing considerations, the fact that a duty is a duty of justice 
provides justification for its enforcement. 7  Miller leaves open the possibility that 
humanitarian duties could be justifiably enforceable under certain conditions, but these 
cases are exceptional.8 How we characterize remedial responsibility on Miller’s account 
therefore matters because it tells us something about the relative weight and justifiable 
enforceability of the relevant duties. 
 
3.  
With this in mind, let us turn to Miller’s account of when remedial responsibility for 
severe poverty is a matter of justice and when it is a humanitarian duty. Miller offers a 
pluralistic account of the grounds of remedial responsibility. He notes that there are 
multiple considerations that figure in determining which agent bears remedial 
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responsibility for a particular situation. These considerations include four retrospective 
and two prospective considerations. The retrospective considerations Miller identifies 
are: having (i) causal, (ii) outcome, or (iii) moral responsibility for the situation in 
question, and (iv) having benefitted from it (pp. 100-103). The prospective 
considerations that Miller takes to figure in establishing remedial responsibility are: (v) 
one’s capacity to remedy the situation, and (vi) being a member of the same community 
as the individuals in need of assistance (pp. 103-105). Each of these considerations 
represents a different way in which an agent can be connected to a particular person in 
need of assistance. According to Miller’s ‘connection theory’ of remedial responsibility, 
‘A should be considered remedially responsible for P’s condition when he is linked to P 
in one of [the above] ways’ (p. 99). However, Miller denies that there is any algorithm for 
establishing remedial responsibility in every case. Although he adopts the uncontroversial 
view that in order to be remedially responsible, the agent must be able to remedy the 
situation in question, 9  none of considerations (i)-(vi) above constitute necessary or 
sufficient conditions, on their own or in combination, for remedial responsibility in every 
case.10 On this account, remedial responsibility is based on the relative strengths of the 
various connections that hold between agents and those in need; and the relative 
strengths of the various connections will vary depending on the circumstances.  
On Miller’s account, remedial responsibility is owed to the very poor as a matter 
of justice in two sorts of situation. One is when remedial responsibility reflects what 
might be referred to as ‘rectificatory responsibility’. Rectificatory responsibility is the 
responsibility to rectify past or ongoing wrongs, and it is therefore grounded in 
retrospective considerations. Where an agent is morally responsible and therefore 
blameworthy for having caused a bad situation or allowed it to happen, it will usually be 
the case that that agent owes compensation or restitution to those who suffered as a 
result.11 On Miller’s account, the same is true when the agent is outcome responsible for 
the situation. An agent is outcome responsible for a situation insofar as the agent can be 
credited or debited for having brought it about (pp. 86-90). This requires that the agent is 
causally responsible for the outcome, that the outcome was the result of ‘genuine agency 
as opposed to inadvertent bodily movement’, and that there was a ‘foreseeable 
connection’ between the agent’s behaviour and the outcome it produces (Ibid.). 
Outcome responsibility is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, but it falls short 
of moral responsibility in that the outcome need not be brought about intentionally, and 
it is not sufficient for judgements of moral praise or blame.  
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There is a great deal more that could be said about the various grounds for 
rectificatory responsibility, but we can set this discussion aside here. What is relevant for 
our current purpose is that there are some cases in which remedial responsibility and 
rectificatory responsibility for severe poverty overlap. Remedial responsibility for severe 
poverty is triggered because it is morally intolerable for the deprivation to go unremedied. 
In some cases, the deprivation in question is the result of past or ongoing wrongs, and so 
rectificatory responsibility is also triggered. 12  On some accounts, it is only when the 
remedially responsible agent also bears rectificatory responsibility that remedial 
responsibility is owed to the very poor as a matter of justice.13  Miller, however, contends 
that remedial responsibility can also be owed to the very poor as a matter of justice in 
another sort of situation.   
   On Miller’s account, remedial responsibility to the very poor is a matter of justice 
when no agent bears rectificatory responsibility for the deprivation in question because 
no agent is outcome responsible for it. An example of this is where severe poverty is the 
result of natural disaster or unforeseeable market shifts (p. 255). In such cases, remedial 
responsibility is not based on outcome or moral responsibility, and is attributed instead 
on the basis of causal responsibility, benefits, capacity, or community. But unlike 
remedial responsibility that overlaps with rectificatory responsibility, remedial 
responsibility grounded in any of these four considerations is not necessarily a matter of 
justice. According to Miller, what makes it a matter of justice in the case of severe 
poverty is that there is a universal human right to subsistence. Miller advances an account 
of human rights according to which they are grounded in basic human needs. On his 
view, all humans are entitled to be provided with assistance in acquiring access to the 
material means necessary for a minimally decent human life when they are unable 
provide for themselves (pp. 184-5). Such rights correlate with duties on the part of others 
to provide assistance. And when a remedially responsible agent’s duty correlates with the 
human right to subsistence, its fulfilment is a matter of justice on Miller’s account. 
   The view that there can be positive duties of justice grounded in human need 
which do not derive from past wrongs is not uncontroversial. 14  Nevertheless, my 
purpose here is neither to criticize nor to defend this view. Rather, my aim is to show 
that Miller’s endorsement of this view is in tension with his denial that remedial 
responsibility for severe poverty is a matter of justice in a further kind of situation. Miller 
holds that remedial responsibility is not owed as a matter of justice when it overlaps with 
rectificatory responsibility, but the agents that bear rectificatory responsibility for the 
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deprivation in question are unwilling to fulfil it (pp. 257-259). According to Miller, 
remedial responsibility in such cases can be acquired by other agents. This is because 
remedial responsibility is triggered by the moral intolerability of the situation going 
unremedied. If the agent that bears primary remedial responsibility refuses to act, the 
situation remains in need of remedy, which is morally intolerable, and so the question of 
remedial responsibility must be posed again, this time taking into account the 
unwillingness of the first agent. In such cases where remedial responsibility is acquired by 
a secondary bearer, however, Miller argues that it is humanitarian in nature. 
This has important implications for thinking about remedial responsibility for 
world poverty. In many cases, severe poverty can be at least partly attributed to corrupt 
or culpably incompetent governments who (explicitly or implicitly) refuse to remedy the 
problem. Furthermore, many rich countries that owe rectificatory responsibility to poor 
countries on the basis of past or ongoing injustice fall short of fulfilling their duties. In 
almost no cases can this be justified by a lack of resources, and it is nearly always for lack 
of political will. In such situations, where people’s suffering is particularly acute, other 
agents will acquire remedial responsibilities on Miller’s view. But, according to Miller, 
these responsibilities will be a matter of humanity and not of justice.  
In what follows, I argue that although Miller is right to think that remedial 
responsibility is acquired by other agents in the sort of case just outlined, he is wrong to 
think that remedial responsibility in such cases is a humanitarian duty rather than a duty 
of justice, at least on his own understanding of this distinction.  
 
4.  
When remedial responsibility has been acquired by a secondary bearer because the 
primary bearer refuses to remedy it, Miller claims that the resulting duties cannot 
justifiably be enforced, even in principle. He concludes from this that these duties are not 
duties of justice (pp. 257-258).15 The argument has the form: 
 
P1: If x is a duty of justice, then x is in principle justifiably enforceable; 
P2: x is not in principle justifiably enforceable; therefore, 
C: x is not a duty of justice 
 
One might object to this line of reasoning by challenging the first premise, but I will not 
consider this possibility here. As I argued in section 2 above, I don’t think there is much 
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at stake in how we employ the terms ‘justice’ and ‘humanity’, as long as we are clear 
about what distinction we are using them to pick out. We can therefore take for granted 
Miller’s use of these terms, and accept the first premise without further discussion. My 
argument in what follows takes for granted the first premise and queries instead Miller’s 
denial of the consequent in the second premise. 
On the face of it, Miller’s argument might appear to beg the question against 
those who take remedial responsibility for severe poverty to be a matter of justice, even 
when it has been acquired by a secondary bearer. Although Miller takes justice and 
enforceability to be closely linked, he is careful to note that a duty’s enforceability is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for it to be a duty of justice.16 This suggests that there is 
some underlying feature or set of features that make a duty a duty of justice, and that it is 
on account of that feature or set of features that duties of justice are in principle 
justifiably enforceable. Miller does not, however, say anything about what these features 
might be, nor does he appeal to them in making the case for denying that remedial 
responsibility for severe poverty is a matter of justice when it has been acquired by a 
secondary bearer. As such, the only support for the second premise of the argument 
seems to be the assumption that remedial responsibility is not a matter of justice in the 
sort of case in question. This cannot be assumed, however, since it is the conclusion of 
the argument.  
But this interpretation misses something important about Miller’s point. 
According to Miller, it is because the primary bearer of remedial responsibility remains 
responsible despite refusing to comply that the enforcement of the duties of the 
secondary bearer cannot be justified, and are therefore not duties of justice. Miller’s 
argument is, then, best read as a reductio: If the duties arising from remedial responsibility 
for severe poverty where this responsibility has been acquired by a secondary bearer were 
duties of justice, then they would be justifiably enforceable. According to this version of 
the argument, it is implausible to think that these duties could be justifiably enforceable; 
therefore they cannot be duties of justice. The trouble with this version of the argument 
is that Miller offers inadequate support for thinking that these duties are not in principle 
justifiably enforceable. The following examples suggest that the fact that the primary 
bearer retains remedial responsibility despite refusing to comply is not enough to support 
the view that the secondary bearer’s duties cannot justifiably be enforced. 
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(1) A group of people, P, are suffering from famine on account of the unforeseeable 
effects of a natural disaster. Nation A is able to easily and effectively assist the members 
of P at little cost by supplying them with food, and A is the only agent in a position to do 
so. 
 
(2) A group of people, P are suffering from famine because of corruption and poor 
governance by the ruling elites of B. The ruling elites of B could make policy changes 
that would end the famine, but they refuse to do so. Although nation A lacks the 
capacity to effectively coerce B into acting, A is able to easily and effectively assist the 
members of P at little cost by supplying them with food; and A is the only agent other 
than B in a position to do so. 
 
On Miller’s account, A has remedial responsibility towards the members of P in 
both examples; however, A’s duties can be justifiably enforced only in (1) and not in (2) 
(p. 257-258). But if we accept that A’s duties in (1) can be justifiably enforced, then why 
not in (2) as well? If the members of P have a human right to subsistence in (1), then 
presumably the members of P hold this right in (2) as well. In (2), B has primary remedial 
responsibility to assist the members of P. Likewise, B is the primary bearer of the duties 
correlative to the human rights to subsistence of the members of P. The question, then, 
is: In (2), when remedial responsibility to assist the members of P is acquired by A in 
light of B’s rigid refusal to act, why doesn’t the justification for the enforcement of the 
resulting duties apply equally to it? 
Miller says little in support of the asymmetry in his account other than to appeal 
to the readers’ judgement. My sense, however, is that widespread judgements will not 
favour his view - or at least that it is not obvious that they will. In example (2) above, 
given (a) the severity of the deprivations suffered by members of P, (b) the fact that they 
have human rights to subsistence, (c) the rigidity of B’s refusal to assist them, and (d) the 
fact that A can do so at little cost, and (e) the fact that A is the only other agent able to 
do so, it seems perfectly plausible to think that A’s remedial responsibility towards P in 
(2) can justifiably be enforced. If we are willing to grant that a third nation, C, would be 
justified in enforcing A’s duties in (1), it does not seem implausible to suggest that C 
would also be justified in enforcing A’s duties in (2), assuming that C lacked the capacity 
to effectively coerce B. This last point is worth underscoring. It would not be justifiable 
for a third party to enforce the duties of the secondary bearer of remedial responsibility if 
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that agent or another agent could effectively enforce the duties of the primary bearer. But 
where this is not the case, given the considerations (a)-(d) above, it is unclear what would 
justify an asymmetry between the justifiability of C enforcing A’s duties in each of the 
two examples. 
My central point is this: If we grant Miller’s view that a human right to 
subsistence underpins the justifiable enforceability of duties in cases where no agent is 
outcome responsible for the deprivation, then we should also think that the same right 
underpins the justifiable enforceability of duties that are the result of the acquisition of 
remedial responsibility by an innocent secondary agent in cases where the primary agent 
is unwilling to act, at least when the secondary bearer can easily and effectively assist at 
little cost.  
 
5.  
Much of the debate so far relies on our intuitions about when it is justifiable to enforce 
remedial responsibility. We have now seen some strong reasons to favour the view that 
remedial responsibility for severe poverty can justifiably be enforced, even when it has 
been acquired by a secondary bearer, but some may remain unconvinced. It might be 
objected that enforcing the duties of a secondary bearer of remedial responsibility is to 
let the primary bearer off the hook. This would be unfair to the secondary bearer, and 
also set a dangerous precedent that could motivate others to shirk their duties. An 
important qualification should help allay this concern and to bolster my case. It involves 
drawing a distinction between two senses in which an agent can be remedially 
responsible.  
An agent can be remedially responsible, on the one hand, in the sense of having 
the responsibility to take remedial action. In the case of severe poverty, this takes the 
form of a duty to assist those in need. On the other hand, an agent might be remedially 
responsible in the sense of having the responsibility to bear the ultimate burdens of 
remedying a situation.17 The same agent might be remedially responsible in both of these 
senses, but this need not be the case. For example, a bystander might bear the immediate 
remedial responsibility to assist the victim of a hit-and-run car accident, but it is also 
reasonable to think that the perpetrator would ultimately be morally obligated to 
compensate the bystander at a later time for any costs incurred in so doing. Although the 
perpetrator gets off the hook for taking remedial action in this case, they remain on the 
hook for bearing the relevant burdens.  
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The claim that remedial responsibility for severe poverty is a matter of justice 
even when it has been acquired by a secondary bearer should be understood as a claim 
about responsibility to take remedial action, and not a claim about responsibility to bear 
the ultimate burdens of remedial action. As we have seen, it does not follow from an 
agent bearing duties of justice to take remedial action that the same agent is also 
responsible to bear the ultimate burdens of the required action. Where an unwilling 
outcome responsible agent remains able to remedy the situation, and where another 
agent has been forced to step in and take remedial action, the responsibility to bear the 
ultimate burden of assistance surely remains with the outcome responsible agent, and 
this responsibility remains a matter of justice.  
To illustrate, consider again example (2) above. Suppose B bears primary 
responsibility both to take action to remedy P’s plight and to bear the ultimate burdens of 
doing so. Given B’s rigid refusal to act combined with the other considerations listed 
earlier, I have argued that it is plausible to think that A acquires remedial responsibility 
towards P, and furthermore that the relevant duties can at least prima facie justifiably be 
enforced, and can thus be duties of justice on Miller’s account. I have now qualified this 
by suggesting that while A may acquire duties of justice to take remedial action as a result 
of B’s refusal to act, A does not necessarily acquire the responsibility to bear the ultimate 
burdens of that action. This responsibility remains with B, who then incurs a debt to A.  
It must be noted, however, that although we can distinguish conceptually 
between duties to take remedial action and duties to bear the ultimate burdens of 
remedial action, in practice these duties are difficult to pull apart: Taking remedial action 
will usually, and perhaps always involve taking on the burdens of that action, at least 
temporarily. A will incur some cost in remedying P’s plight, even if we think that B 
should ultimately compensate A accordingly. This raises a reasonable worry: Given B’s 
rigid refusal to take action in remedying P’s plight despite having the responsibility to do 
so, and despite this being a matter of justice, there is little reason to think that B is likely 
to willingly compensate A for having picked up the slack. And given that no agent had 
the capacity to coerce B to fulfil its primary duties, to force A to take remedial action is 
effectively to force A also to take on the ultimate burdens of that action. Distinguishing 
between the two senses in which an agent can be remedially responsible then looks like it 
will have little relevance in our assessment of many actual cases in which the agent who 
bears primary remedial responsibility remains morally on the hook for bearing the 
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burdens of remedying the situation, but is, for all intents and purposes, practically off the 
hook. I argue, however, that this should not detract from the plausibility of the view. 
Suppose A has acted under threat of force so as to remedy P’s plight, thus 
incurring certain costs, and B predictably refuses to compensate A and cannot be 
coerced into doing so. One way of describing what has happened in this case is that the 
burden of injustice has been shifted from P to A. Although P’s situation is remedied, an 
injustice persists as long as B does not compensate A. This is morally unacceptable in the 
sense that all injustices are morally unacceptable, but it seems that, given certain 
constraints, it is more acceptable than leaving P to bear the burden. The relevant 
constraints have to do with the size of the burden. Recall that remedial responsibility is 
triggered by particularly bad situations – situations whose remedy is a matter of some 
urgency, for example because people are dying or suffering enormously. It would be 
unjustifiable to force A to remedy P’s plight if it meant that members of A would then 
suffer a similar plight as a result of B’s predictable refusal to compensate. But if the cost 
to A is minimal, as I described it in example (2), then shifting the burden of injustice 
from P to A is not only acceptable, but required and, plausibly, in some cases, justifiably 
enforceable.18 Furthermore, this need not – and indeed should not – be the end of the 
story. The fact that an injustice remains may lack practical relevance now in light of the 
unlikelihood of it being rectified in the foreseeable future; but this does not mean that it 
will never have practical relevance. Injustices do not simply fade away over time.19 The 
fact that an injustice remains would support the case for rectification or restitution to be 
enforced at some point in the future, should this become feasible. 
 
6.  
I have discussed three situations in which an agent owes remedial responsibility to 
another or others suffering from severe poverty. First is the case in which the agent is 
outcome responsible for the poverty, second is the case in which no agent is outcome 
responsible for the poverty, and third is the case in which another agent is outcome 
responsible for the poverty but unwilling to remedy it. On Miller's account remedial 
responsibility is triggered in each of these cases, but it is only a matter of justice in the 
first two. I have argued that, given his understanding of what it means for something to 
be a duty of justice, namely that it can justifiably be enforced, and given his view that 
there is a human right to subsistence that grounds remedial responsibility as a matter of 
justice in the second kind of case, we should also think that remedial responsibility is a 
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matter of justice in at least some instances of the third kind of case as well. I have added 
the qualification that this only applies to remedial responsibility in the sense of 
responsibility to take remedial action, and not to the responsibility to bear the ultimate 
burdens of remedying the situation, although it might be a requirement of justice for the 
secondary bearer to carry the burden until the primary agent compensates willingly or 
can be effectively coerced.   
I conclude with a final qualification, namely that it does not follow from remedial 
responsibility being a matter of justice in each kind of case discussed that the associated 
duties all carry the same weight. Even if we accept that duties of justice are, in general, 
weightier than humanitarian duties, we need not think that all duties of justice are equally 
weighty. There is good reason to think that duties to assist those whose poverty one is 
outcome responsible for will outweigh duties to assist those whose poverty no agent is 
outcome responsible for, and that these will in turn outweigh duties to assist those whose 
poverty an unwilling agent is outcome responsible for. This ranking, however, does not 
suggest that any of these duties are not duties of justice, and indeed the human right to 
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